Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Attila Gaspar
Author-Name: Tommaso Giommoni
Author-Name: Massimo Morelli
Author-Name: Antonio Nicolò
Title: Corruption and Extremism
Abstract: This paper shows that corruption generates extremism, but almost exclusively on the opposition side. When the majority has greater ability to use corruption to obtain her favorite policy outcome from the minority, then the minority group has an incentive to select a more extreme representative because it is more unlikely that such a type will accept a bribe. On the majority side, on the other hand, the perception of more likely use of the corruption tool does not create any distortion in the choice of political representatives. We provide strong causal evidence for these novel predictions using two different types of corruption signals, in Indonesia and Brazil.
Classification-JEL: D72, D73
Keywords: Corruption, Extremism, Delegation, elections
Length: 34
Number: 21163
Creation-Date: 2021
File-URL: https://repec.unibocconi.it/baffic/baf/papers/cbafwp21163.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 1236
Handle: RePEc:baf:cbafwp:cbafwp21163