Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Angelo D'Andrea
Title:Mayor’s wage and Public procurement
Abstract:In this paper I run a regression discontinuity design analysis to document the causal effect of mayor’s wage on procurement outcomes in a large data base of public procurement contracts in Italy.To identify the wage effect, I use peculiarities of the Italian legislation where mayor’s remuneration varies at pre-determined population thresholds. My main results are as follows. First, a higher wage (i.e., my treatment) is not related with differences in aggregate measures of procurement: number of tenders, total procurement expenditure and the mean value of the contract in the municipality. Second, some of the ex-ante procurement outcomes are positively affected by mayor’s wage: the number of admitted offers and final rebates on the reserve price. Finally, a higher wage causes a significant decrease in the probability that the same firm is awarded a contract repeatedly. This paper is the first to document a direct relationship between mayor’s salary and public procurement.
Classification-JEL:H0, H5, H57, H7, H76
Keywords:Public procurement, Local governments, Public wages
Length: 42
Number: 19125
Creation-Date: 2019
File-URL: https://repec.unibocconi.it/baffic/baf/papers/cbafwp19125.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 934
Handle: RePEc:baf:cbafwp:cbafwp19125