Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Donato Masciandaro
Author-Name: Francesco Passarelli
Title: POPULISM, FINANCIAL INEQUALITY AND CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE: A POLITICAL ECONOMICS APPROACH
Abstract: This paper examines myopic, populist policies that guarantee short-term financial protection of the people from the elite without regard for long-term fiscal or monetary distortions. Assuming that citizens arefinancially heterogeneous, this paper shows that inefficient outcomes can arise when the majority of citizens are bank stakeholders. Populist policies promote politically controlled central banks.
Classification-JEL:D72, D78, E31, E52, E58, E62
Keywords: Populism, central bank independence, monetary policy, banking policy, political economy
Length: 23 pages 
Number: 1874
Creation-Date: 2018
File-URL: https://repec.unibocconi.it/baffic/baf/papers/cbafwp1874.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 452
Handle: RePEc:baf:cbafwp:cbafwp1874